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DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
58-1-16,1953 Utah Code, as amended: 
Notice of disciplinary action - Hearing officers - Director's powers - Evidence 
(1) ... 
(2) (a) All adjudicative proceedings shall be held before an appropriate 
presiding officer, as designated by the director. 
(b) The presiding officer shall make written recommendations for action, 
findings of fact, and conclusions of law. 
(c) The director, with the concurrence of the appropriate board, may issue 
a written order based on the recommendations but is not bound to follow the 
recommendations of the presiding officer. 
(d) If the director does not issue an order within ten days after the 
presiding officer has made the recommendations, the recommendations of the presiding 
officer shall become the order. 
THE COURSE OF PROCEEDING BELOW 
Hearing in the matter of the license of Carl W. Barney to practice as a health facility 
administrator in the State of Utah, case number, OPL-91-69, came before the Division of 
Occupational and Professional Licensing with J. Steven Eklund, Administrative Law Judge with 
the Department of Commerce, as presiding officer by designation of David E. Robinson, 
Director, Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing. Also, administrative review of 
the proceedings was had before the Department of Commerce Executive Director C. B. White, 
oral argument being denied. 
At the hearing the Division was represented by Cy H. Castle, Assistant Attorney General, 
State of Utah. The petitioner was present and represented through counsel, Dale E. Stratford. 
Five members of the Health Facility Administrators Board were present: the Chair of the board, 
Sue Bowker, Joyce Hailing, Terry Lemmon, Barbara Adams and Joseph Anderson were also 
present. And the director of the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing, David E. 
Robinson, was also present sitting with the Board. 
Director Robinson used an inquisitorial manner to examine most of the witnesses at the 
hearing into all aspects of the operation of a health care facility. This included nursing services, 
rates of occupancy, consultants, medical directors, staffing levels, break even points and 
profitability. (Transcript at pp. 944-945). 
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These are matters regularly surveyed for and better left to the regulation of the 
Department of Finance (p. 945). 
Inflammatory and wildly prejudicial allegations like drugging patents through the halls, 
practicing medicine, unlawful detention and unlawful restraints being used were all presented 
and not proved. (Record at pp. 87-96). 
In the end the facts found were these: 
The petitioner had physically abused and/or used excessive force by 
failing to seek extra help to control psychiatric residents in four instances. 
The petitioner had administered medication to an unidentified (probably 
non existent) patient in one instance. 
The petitioner had spilled medication by negligently tipping over a cart 
with no damage to anyone. 
See: Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law and Recommended Order, (at pp. 
87-96). 
Constant repetition of unproved allegations has magnified matters beyond reason. 
SUMMARY OF REPLY 
Courts will hold administrative agencies to an observance of the elementary basics of due 
process of law. 
Fundamental due process is not easily waived where orderly procedures prove ineffective 
and even risky for one who would object to plain error. 
The petitioner did not fail to preserve objections by not performing timely acts that would 
have been useless. 
The Division fashions for itself a kind of retributory role designed to punish people where 
other agencies have not done so. 
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Harmless error analysis is not appropriate where structural error is pervasive and goes 
beyond ordinary hearing errors. 
REPLY ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AGENCY ACTION OR THE STATUTE OR RULE ON 
WHICH IT IS BASED OR AS APPLIED IS SUBJECT TO APPELLATE REVIEW 
The due process of law requirement for the conduct of agency action consists of more 
than conclusionary statements and innuendoes not fitting within a specific basis for judicial 
review under Section 63-46b-16 (4) as claimed in Respondent's brief. (Pg. 13.) 
It has been recognized by the Utah Supreme Court to be a clear violation of state due 
process where one in the position of the director of the division of the department involved 
herein would investigate, prosecute, and then participate as a judge in the adjudication of a case. 
Petitioner's brief and the record herein is clear in that Director Robinson had investigated the case 
in various stages, that he presented a substantial part of the allegations at the hearing, that he sat 
with the board hearing the case, that he appointed a presiding officer in the form of an 
administrative law judge assigned to the Department of Commerce to hear the case, and that he 
had adjudicated the case on the recommendation of a board influenced with his presence, 
comments and directions throughout the hearing. Sheer numbers of bodies can hardly disguise or 
lessen the role played by Mr. Robinson. See: In Re McCune, 111 P.2d. 701 (Utah -1986) at p. 
706. 
The Utah Administrative Procedure Act 63-46b-1 et. al. permits the court to grant relief if 
it determines that the petitioner has been substantially prejudiced by an agency action which is 
unconstitutional or based on a statute or rule which is unconstitutional. Questar Pipeline v. Tax 
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Commission, 817 P.2d. 316, (Utah 1991). at p. 317. Agency determinations of constitutional 
provisions are to be reviewed under a correction of error standard, giving no deference to the 
agency's decision. 
POINT II 
THE PARTICIPATION OF PETITIONER AT THE HEARING UNDER 
THE GROUND RULES AND POLICY OF THE DIVISION DID NOT 
WAIVE PETITIONERS EXPECTATION OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW 
At p. 19, note 7, of the respondent's brief, it is noted (p. 20) that the Division has now 
adopted a policy that the Division Director will not participate in any hearing which has been 
delegated to a Board with the assistance of an administrative law judge. This "new" policy was 
instigated upon the concerns of this court expressed in Pickett v. Department of Commerce, 858 
P.2d. 187, (Utah App. -1993). However, the Division's "new" policy of due process comes too 
late for the petitioner herein, because the hearing predated the Division's present concern for 
fairness. (Respondent's brief, f.n. p. 20). 
Contrary to the position of the respondent, the petitioner did not waive any right to due 
process under the structures expressed in Pickett (Supra.). The administrative law judge, on the 
transcript in the record of the hearing, at p. 822, states: 
"The record should reflect (emphasis added) that during those recesses, 
most of which occurred off the record with counsel for both parties' concerns were 
raised with the court by counsel for respondent as to certain conduct of Mr. 
Robinson. And it was to him that any of those concerns and also any of those 
instructions were directed, although they were generally worded to include 
members of the Board and perhaps on one occasion even counsel for both 
parties." 
and again, at p. 823: 
"The record should also reflect (emphasis added) that counsel for 
respondent had some hesitancy in directly raising any objections during the 
hearing as to the conduct of Mr. Robinson, for appropriate reasons that can be left 
unsaid. 
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The administrative law judge further remarked: 
..."I have, in many other cases, had occasion to observe Mr. Robinson in a 
role similar to that which he has played in this case." 
What sort of other objection would have carried any weight at the hearing is hard to 
understand. Even after the in-camera exchange described here, Mr. Robinson was allowed to 
continue at the hearing in presenting his own investigation and questioning of the petitioner at 
cross-examination, and with no further admonitions from the judge. (Transcript at pp. 944 - 945). 
The "...appropriate reasons that can be left unsaid" says it all. Justice must appear to do 
justice. 
POINT III 
FAILURE TO ACCORD DUE PROCESS OF LAW IS PLAIN 
ERROR AND WILL CONSTITUTE SUBSTANTIAL PREJUDICE 
UNDER THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT 
Respondent contends that the petitioner must necessarily have made his objections as to 
hearing error promptly and to have sought redress for each error in the progression of the 
proceedings. See: Onyeabor v. Pro Roofing, Inc., 787 P.2d. 525 (Ut. App. -1990); State v. 
Cabututan, 861 P.2d. 408, (Utah -1993). Otherwise, the objections raised on the record with the 
administrative law judge should not be considered on appeal. 
InD. B. v. Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing, 779 P.2d. 1145, (Ut. 
App. -1989), states that as a general rule, objections or questions which have not been raised or 
urged in the proceedings before the administrative agency will not be considered by the court on 
review of the order of the agency. However, "we are not precluded from reversing in a case of 
plain error such as this." (at p. 1148). 
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Still, questions and objections were raised with the administrative law judge who had 
been designated as the presiding officer for the hearing, and throughout the hearing although not 
necessarily directly raised "for appropriate reasons that can be left unsaid." (Transcript at p. 823). 
The judge explains that he would then give cautionary instructions "in a general sense" to apply 
to Mr. Robinson (Transcript at p. 822). 
Structural defects like the free ranging conduct of Mr. Robinson at the hearing do not 
lend themselves to harmless error analysis. The entire conduct of the hearing from beginning to 
end is obviously affected by the presence of the director who is not impartial and who is 
co-officiating. Constitutional deprivations as to the structure of the hearing affect the frame work 
within which the inquiry proceeds. Without basic protections the hearing cannot reliably serve 
its function to regulate the course of the hearing to obtain full disclosure of relevant facts and to 
afford parties reasonable opportunity to present their position. See: Arizona v. Fulminate, 499 
U.S. 279; 111 S.Ct. 1246; 113 L.Ed. 2d. 302 (1990) at pp. 309-310; D.B. v. Division of 
Occupational and Professional Licensing, Supra., at pp. 1147-1149. 
The conclusion of the D.B. Court was that D.B.'s hearing "lacked the due process required 
by law, was unfair, and constitutes "substantial prejudice" to him." So it is with the petitioner 
herein. 
POINT IV 
PRINCIPLES OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY PROTECTION, 
LIKE DUE PROCESS, DO APPLY TO AGENCY ACTION 
"There is a double jeopardy clause in the United States Constitution, Amendment V, in 
the Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 12, and in the Code of Criminal Procedure, U.C.A., 
1953, Title 77-1-6 (2) (a). The double jeopardy provision of the Fifth Amendment is a guarantee 
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so fundament to American criminal justice that it has been held binding on the States through the 
Fourteenth Amendment." McNair v. Hayward, 666 P.2d. 321 (Utah -1993). at p. 323. 
Petitioner has asserted that the double jeopardy clause of the federal constitution forbids a second 
hearing for the purpose of affording the State of Utah another opportunity to supply evidence 
which it failed to muster in a first attempt to convict Carl Barney of assault on Peggy Anderson. 
This is central to the objective of the prohibition against successive trials and repeated attempts 
to convict an individual for an alleged offense. 
Unlike under the Utah criminal references, the question under the Fifth Amendment is not 
one of how the State categorizes the proceeding: criminal, civil, or special. The question is not 
whether it is civil or criminal, but rather whether it is punishment for some offense. Under 
United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435; 109 S.Ct. 1892; 104 L.Ed. 2d. 487; (1989) at p. 448, the 
question is whether forfeiture serves in part to punish, and one need not excuse the possibility 
that forfeiture serves other purposes to reach that conclusion. 
Grounds for the revocation of the petitionees license by the Division is found in Title 
58-1-15, U.C.A., 1953, as amended. The division may suspend or revoke the license of any 
licensee who is or has been guilty of unprofessional conduct as defined. Moreover, in the same 
statute, it may suspend or revoke the license of one who has been convicted of a crime involving 
moral turpitude which, when considered with the functions and duties of the occupation or 
profession for which the license was issued, demonstrates a threat to the public health, safety, 
and welfare. A fair reading of the words of the statute establish that suspension or revocation of 
licenses issued by the division serves in part as punishment for the conviction of crime. That is 
how the statute has been applied by the Division, and that is how the revocation of the 
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petitioner's license has been used here, even though he has never been convicted of any crime 
charged by the Division. 
The punishment is clear and was clearly called for in the prosecution's argument at the 
close of the hearing: "...we believe that it's appropriate for you as a board to punish Mr. Barney 
for his conduct." (Transcript at p. 973.), "...his conduct deserves punishment..." (Transcript 
at p. 1002). 
The inclusion in the notice of agency action of conduct for which Mr. Barney had been 
acquitted at trial in a Utah Court of Law, and his successive trial for that conduct constitutes 
structural error designed to assure the full weight of punishment be meted out to Mr. Barney. 
That inclusion was sufficient to assure that full punishment was imposed for that conduct. 
Evocation may not have been had on other charges alone. The result is that the petitioner is 
made to suffer substantial prejudice within the meaning of that phrase in Savage Industries v. 
State Tax Commission, 811 P.2d. 664, (Utah -1991), at p. 669. 
POINT V 
REFUSAL TO HEAR WITNESSES FAVORABLE TO THE PETITIONER 
BECAUSE TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE WAS NOT HARMLESS ERROR 
The presiding officer shall regulate the course of the hearing to obtain full disclosure of 
relevant facts and to afford all the parties reasonable opportunity to present their position. The 
administrative law judge had a statutory duty to obtain full disclosure of the facts. The course he 
took was unfair to the petitioner and the agency failed to follow prescribed procedure. D.B. v. 
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing, Supra., at pp. 1147-1148. 
The issue in the D.B. case was a failure to allow cross-examination of agency witnesses, 
which was clearly manifest error. The difference between no cross examination and of not 
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hearing witnesses at all because the court has run out of time is not apparent to the party trying to 
make his case. 
The respondent claims some wiggle room by reciting discretion in the presiding officer to 
exclude evidence that is irrelevant, immaterial or unduly repetitious either on his own motion or 
upon objection of a party. See: Title 63-46b-8 (1) (b) (i). Here he just flat out refuses to hear 
witnesses. 
The reason for that is clear, and it has nothing to do with discretion: 
Had we the luxury of time that would allow this proceeding to run to an 
ultimate conclusion regardless of its length attempts would be made to obtain 
those exhibits and make them part of this record subject to any questions. We do 
not have that luxury. (Transcript at p. 797, Eklund). 
Mr. Stratford I know you have indicated that you had perhaps six or seven 
additional witnesses beyond Mr. Barney who would testify later today. Frankly I 
don't think we have the time to take them. (Transcript at p. 797, Eklund). 
...I'm not suggesting your requests were inappropriate at all. We simply 
do not have the time and resources to accommodate those requests. (Transcript 
at p. 800, Eklund). 
Unfortunately, under the circumstances we're dealing with - the time 
constraints we have...we will commence testimony from Mr. Barney and carry 
this hearing to it's conclusion and finish it no later than 6:00 p.m. today. 
(Transcript at p. 826, Eklund). 
I recognize we are operating with a lay board and that that Board, at least 
one member of that Board, has indicated a desire that by 6:00 he's gone. And I 
recognize that the Court may hold the Board beyond that time, but I don't know 
that that's effective. Knowing his time schedule, knowing his time frame, I'm not 
sure that he would be willing to consider and discuss the matter. (Transcript at 
p. 815, Stratford). 
This is not what the statute about irrelevant, immaterial or unduly repetitious evidence 
provides for. 
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If time had gotten away, the most obvious reason is the heavy presence of Mr. Robinson 
sitting with the Board. The director's powers were to designate a presiding officer, and with the 
concurrence of an appropriate board to perhaps issue a written order based on recommendations. 
58-1-16,1953 U.C.A. Director Robinson did issue his order, based on who knows what, but 
Mr. Barney had been deprived of important defense witnesses by substantial interference on the 
part of the division director. 
Substantial allegations against Mr. Barney were not alleged in particularity as to time and 
place. Defense witnesses could testify that division witnesses were either not employed or 
unable to be where they said they were to see what they said they saw. Witnesses had discussed 
the events and developed various inconsistent versions of their recollections. One prospective 
defense witness had even been approached to give testimony in support of those various 
recollections. 
However, the one potential witness with the greatest knowledge of the psychiatric care 
plans was not allowed to testify. (Transcript, pp. 808-809). 
The D.B. court faced with the apparentcy of established "unprofessional conduct" could 
say that while the record may constitute a basis upon which the Division could justify revocation, 
...we believe that such should be permitted only in proceedings where the 
Division itself affords a fair hearing under due process as mandated and required 
by law. (Transcript at p. 1148). 
The court is not precluded from reversing in a case of plain error. D.B. v. Division of 
Occupational and Professional Licensing, Supra. To apply a doctrine of harmless error to such a 
case is not justified. 
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CONCLUSION 
The function of judicial review of the orders of administrative agencies is limited to 
assuring the legality of, and compliance with, the process that the law has established to regulate 
affairs in the public interest. It is not the function of a court to judge the professional 
qualifications or practices being regulated. 
Petitioner asks that the Court grant relief from an order of the agency by determining that 
the petitioner has been substantially prejudiced by unconstitutional agency action, that due 
process of law was not satisfied, and that the action has been arbitrary or capricious. 
The petitioner herein asks that Court for total relief from the order of the Department of 
Commerce dated on November 10,1993, revoking the petitioner's license to act as a Health 
Facility Administrator. 
DATED this day of , 1994. 
Respectfully Submitted. 
DALE E. STRATFORD 
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant, 
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